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“Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and
Important
Ruth V. Aguilera and Cynthia A. Williams
“On the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.
Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy. . . . Your main
constituents are your employees, your customers and your products.”1
– Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric

I. INTRODUCTION
While virtually all scholars of corporate governance agree that
national differences exist in corporate governance practices and their
efficacy, debate continues regarding the relevant dimensions of
difference and how to best explain them. In this Essay, we argue that
the strong conceptual and empirical link between law and finance as
proposed within the legal origins theory and fully launched in a series
of articles by LLSV2 is inaccurate, incomplete, and yet important. At
the least, it is important to get a clearer view of the field such that we
may better understand the broader scope of the “law-finance”
relationship, particularly as the law and finance theory has had
demonstrated effects on international policy developments.
A number of scholars have effectively demonstrated the key
shortcomings of this theoretical and empirical unidirectional linkage
from law to finance.3 We do not need to review that literature here,

 Associate Professor and Fellow at the Center for Professional Responsibility in
Business and Society, College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
 Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1. Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009.
2. We use the acronym “LLSV” to refer to the four authors of the first legal origins
papers, which include Rafael La Porta, Francisco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
3. See generally Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002);
Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J.
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but we find it convincing. And, in response to some of their critics,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have rectified some of their
strong and prescriptive former claims.4 In this Essay, we discuss in
Part II what we have learned from this agitated debate with so many
policy and real life ramifications, why it is important to conceptualize
a larger and more complex picture of the proposed law-finance
causality, what we can learn from existing research on comparative
systems in social science, and what we need to study next in the field
of research of legal systems and economic sociology. In Part III, we
discuss why it is important to get “law and finance” right.
II. THE VIEW FROM ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY:
LAW AS A PARTIAL VIEW
A. Complementarities Matter
One could take multiple routes to illustrate the principle that
looking simply at the characteristics of the legal system to explain
economic outcomes is incomplete. One limitation is, perhaps, the
methodological tools we use to analyze these questions. For
instance, it seems rather narrow to summarize the advanced
industrialized countries into two stylized systems: liberal market
economies and coordinated market economies, which happen to
correspond nicely to the common and civil law dichotomy. Perhaps
the explanation for simplicity is the methodological limitations we
face in comparative corporate governance research and comparative
law—namely, a large number of potential explanatory variables and a
small number of cases. Kogut and Ragin put it well when discussing
the limited diversity within varieties of capitalism and their empirical
rejection of the hypothesis of a direct relationship between rule of
law and financial development. They state that “[c]ontrary to silver
bullet theories, many studies recognize that economic systems are
varied and that there is more than one path to wealth.”5

CORP. L. 111 (2008); Mathias M. Siems, Simon Deakin & Priya Lele, The Evolution of Labour
Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 133 (2007).
4. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
5. Bruce Kogut & Charles Ragin, Exploring Complexity When Diversity is Limited:
Institutional Complementarity in Theories of Rule of Law and National Systems Revisited, 3
EUR. MGMT. REV. 44, 50 (2006).
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Organizations are widely conceived as complex systems of
interdependent factors, but empirical methodology often poorly
reflects such interdependence. For example, standard linear models,
such as regression analysis, treat variables as competing to explain
variation in the outcome rather than focusing on how causes may
combine in specific cases to create outcomes. Meanwhile, case studies
have an important tradition in organizational research, but such
studies face the challenge of generalizing across cases or using cases
effectively to better “contextualize” the boundary conditions of
existing theories. Recently, new innovations in comparative research
methods have been developed and applied to the comparative study
of corporate governance at the organizational or national level. In
particular, a number of newer small-n and set-theoretic methods,
such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (“QCA”), have been
applied to cross-national data (where n is small)6 or to organizational
analysis where causation is complex and there is more than one path
to an outcome.7
Jackson and Aguilera have used this comparative methodology to
study why the twenty-two OECD8 countries used in their study
show such diverse ownership structures and how these ownership
structures have shifted over time—from the 1990s to the 2000s.9
They were able to systematically explore various existing explanatory
factors in conjunction (law, financial systems, labor markets, political
system, board composition, etc.).10 They demonstrate, for example,
that law is necessary but not sufficient to explain economic
organization.11 More specifically, their analysis rejects the sweeping
conclusions drawn from most of LLSV’s studies.12 They show that
quality of law proves necessary for ownership dispersion, at least at a

6. See generally id.
7. See generally CHARLES C. RAGIN, REDESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: FUZZY SETS AND
BEYOND (2008).
8. OECD stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The
OECD is an organization of thirty countries committed to democracy and the market
economy. See About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103
_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
9. Gregory Jackson & Ruth V. Aguilera, Some Determinants of Diversity on CrossNational Corporate Ownership: A Fuzzy Sets Approach (2009) (working paper, on file with
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry).
10. Id. at 4–5.
11. Id. at 2, 5.
12. Id. at 20.
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minimum threshold, but that the reverse case (concentrated
ownership as a reflection of poor quality of law) is not necessarily
true.13 That is, Jackson and Aguilera show that not all cases of
concentration are the result of bad law.
The need to study driving factors in conjunction to obtain a
more comprehensive yet systematic understanding of relationships is
also true for the political hypothesis based on Gourevitch and
Shinn14 and Roe.15 The political factors influencing ownership
structure, as discussed by Roe and Gourevitch, appear to be
important, but they are missing interesting nuances if not explored in
combination with other explanatory factors, such as the structure of
labor forces, law, finance, etc. That is to say that strong-law and
weak majoritarian institutions are sufficient but not necessary for
dispersion. The main point from this research is equifinality,
suggesting that there are multiple paths to any given outcome. For
instance, if strong law is not present then there might be substitutes
(strong labor and left-wing politics) to strong law that in
complementarity lead to the same outcome that strong law would
lead. It also suggests that there is not one best Pareto optimal
solution in institutional settings or a one-model-fits-all best practice
of corporate governance.
B. The Difficulty of Transplantation and the Reality of Translation
It is particularly illuminating to explore nonpure models, such as
examining what happens when archetypical “Anglo-Saxon”
shareholder-value-oriented practices are implemented in non-AngloSaxon institutional environments. Examining the transplantation of
such corporate governance practices allows us to get a deeper
understanding of how countries, industries, and firms are selective in
their adoption of “pure” corporate governance practices and even
more often how some effort is invested into translating those
practices so they fit into their environment. A good illustration of the
diffusion of practices is the globalization of Anglo-American
institutional investors in the mid-1990s, which shocked the recipient
host countries’ established norms and practices but did not manage

13. Id.
14. PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005).
15. Roe, supra note 3.
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to fundamentally transform them. We will draw on two empirical
examples to be more specific.
First, Goyer’s research comparing foreign investment in France
and Germany demonstrates that law and ownership structures cannot
account for the disparities in the investment allocation by short-term
investors in those two countries.16 He looks at the different patterns
of investment by short-term institutional investors in France and
Germany and finds that for stakes above the five percent level, shortterm investors are twice as likely to invest in France as compared to
Germany.17 Why? Because Germany’s work councils and organized
labor make it more difficult to set in motion short-term oriented
strategies to extract shareholder value, while labor is less powerful in
France.18
Second, the translations that occur with transplantation are not
only ideological but also structural, as illustrated in the research by
Ahmadjian and Robbins.19 They show that the foreign (mostly U.S.)
ownership of Japanese firms grew from five percent in 1990 to
twenty percent in 2001; these foreign investments led to a clash of
capitalism between foreign share owners and local owners (mostly
banks and other local firms).20 Foreign owners were interested in
establishing shareholder-oriented (short-term) practices such as
downsizing and asset divestitures.21 Ahmadjian and Robbins are able
to show that the presence of foreign capital determined the levels of
downsizing and divestitures in this period in Japan—practices highly
inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder capitalism and challenging
traditional lifetime employment.22 When Japanese owners maintained
control, however, these shareholder-friendly practices still occurred,
but at a much slower rate.23

16. Michel Goyer, Capital Mobility, Varieties of Institutional Investors, and the
Transforming Stability of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, in BEYOND
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 195 (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes & Mark Thatcher eds., 2007).
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 206–15.
19. See generally Christina L. Ahmadjian & Gregory E. Robbins, A Clash of Capitalisms:
Foreign Shareholders and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 451
(2005); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 14; Roe, supra note 3.
20. Ahmadjian & Robbins, supra note 19, at 452.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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C. The Relationship of Law and Politics
Roe argues that legal institutions are a direct derivative of politics
because countries have different preferences concerning the
legitimacy of shareholder value.24 If shareholder value is considered
legitimate, institutions are then built to protect minority
shareholders.25 By contrast, the absence of institutional arrangements
that would protect the rights and promote the interests of minority
shareholders in some countries reflects the lack of legitimacy about
caring only for shareholders. Thus, the question is not about the
technical issue of building an efficient system of corporate law, but
about the issue of whether political will exists to do so.
Roe further argues that it is simplistic to think that legal
institutions which were introduced seven hundred years ago, such as
the civil law code-based jurisprudence, are as important in
influencing economic life as regulations that were introduced fifty
years ago, such as the 1933 U.S. Glass-Steagall Act or the 1936
Italian Banking Law introduced in reaction to the 1930s financial
crisis and the Second World War.26 We find these arguments
persuasive.
D. Ownership Structures—Dispersed Is Not Necessarily Optimal
The implicit assumption of the legal origins theory is that
dispersed ownership within corporations is the ownership structure
most likely to produce the best economic outcomes. Yet, most firms
in the world are not owned by dispersed shareholders but are firms
with controlling shareholders, mainly family-owned firms or firms
owned by either large institutional investors or the state.27 Even in
the United States—the archetypical Anglo-Saxon shareholderoriented country with dispersed ownership—between 1992 and

24. Roe, supra note 3, at 267.
25. Id. at 262–63.
26. Mark J. Roe, Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. COMP. ECON.
294, 295–308 (2007).
27. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and
Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2742–44 (2000); Mara Faccio &
Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366
(2002); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany,
and France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30, 32–37 (1997); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 287;
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON.
461, 462–65 (1986).
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1999, one-third of the largest firms (the Standard & Poor 500
Industrial (“S&P 500”)), which accounted for eighteen percent of
the S&P 500 equity stake, had family ownership control structures.28
The legal origins research and some finance scholars argue
(sometimes quite forcefully) that continued family ownership
generally leads to poor performance; hence, they recommend that a
more efficient ownership structure aligning management with
shareholders’ interests is dispersed ownership with strong minority
shareholders protection.29 However, the jury is still out within the
corporate finance literature on whether family-owned firms perform
worse—or better—than firms with nonfamily ownership. For
example, Anderson and Reeb state, “[C]ontrary to the notion that
family ownership is detrimental, we find stronger firm performance
in family than in nonfamily firms.”30 Villalonga and Amit report
similar results.31 As argued by agency scholars, concentrated
ownership can be advantageous to minimize managerial
expropriation because it combines ownership and control.32 Of
course, as uncovered by Faccio et al., in the case of East Asian
markets or the Adelphia U.S. case, this monitoring will only work
when there are transparent financial markets and nonfraudulent
accounting, respectively.33
Another dimension of corporate ownership to be understood is
not so much the type of owner but how much they own (i.e.,
concentration). We do not equate the owner’s identity with the
firm’s responsibility as one did fifty years ago with the Fords, the
DuPonts, and the Rockefellers of Chandler’s multidivisional firms,
probably because firms have become so large and because there is a
mix of ownership (as in the United States). It is also arguable that
U.S. corporate governance has shifted from “managerial capitalism”
with dispersed retail ownership where managers made the key

28. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003).
29. See generally RANDALL MORCK, CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (2000).
30. Anderson & Reeb, supra note 28, at 1303.
31. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and
Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (2006).
32. Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).
33. Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, Dividends and Expropriation, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 54, 72 (2001).
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decisions, to “investor capitalism.”34 As Davis argues in his book,
Managed by Markets: How Finance Reshaped America, the arrival of
postindustrial society, predicted by Daniel Bell, in which the great
majority of jobs are in the service sector, accompanied by a weaker
relationship between employers and employees and a shift in pension
financing from defined benefit company pensions to “defined
contribution plans” (401(k)), has triggered the massive growth of
the mutual fund industry.35 Mutual funds and other institutional
investors are growing in size and ownership concentration. Davis
states, “Nearly three quarters of the average Fortune 1000
corporation’s shares were owned by institutional investors in 2005,
with mutual funds making up the most concentrated block.”36 Yet,
these portfolio shareholders show a remarkable lack of engagement
(“voice”) as shareholders, primarily exercising exit, having high ratios
of share turnover in their portfolios, both in the Anglo-Saxon
countries as well as in Europe.37 This is explained in part because it is
very expensive to express voice, and second, even very large
shareholders such as Hermes in the UK rarely have enough control
to discipline managers.38 As a result, investor capitalism still presents
the problem of potential managerial expropriation.
E. Future Research
The development of capitalism in the twenty-first century,
particularly after the U.S. financial collapse and its subsequent
recession, is entering a new era where there is a conflict between the
increasing globalization of markets, finance, regulation, corporate
activity, managers, and knowledge, and the many economic activities
that are very much grounded at the state level. The state has played a
much more central role in economic life in Europe and Asia until
recently, either through regulation or through direct firm ownership
34. MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 5–8 (1997); Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance
Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR.
MGMT. REV. 11, 13–21 (2008).
35. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA
(2009).
36. Gerald F. Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of
Organizations, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 27, 33 (2009).
37. Gregory Jackson, A New Financial Capitalism? Explaining the Persistence of Exit
over Voice in Contemporary Corporate Governance, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 23, 24–25 (2008).
38. Id. at 24.
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and strategic intervention. The state’s active role in economic and
social life, including welfare state provisions, has been for the most
part sustained despite the strong 1990s shareholder-oriented
pressures from the United States. These pressures resulted in an
international hybridization process, ranging from full adoption of
some practices, such as anti-trust regulation, to complete rejection of
some practices such as compensation disclosure, as documented in an
edited book by Morgan, Whitley and Moen,39 and in a book by
Djelic40 on the “Americanization” of European firms, and in an
article on how national culture might buffer organizational level
innovation and institutional change,41 among many others. The
pattern emerging now in the United States shows a more proactive
and monitoring role in the economic governance and regulatory
relationship between markets and firms. This is particularly so after
the government interventions in some of the largest American
companies that were striving to achieve maximum shareholder value
and yet now are partially or majority state-owned, such as AIG and
Citigroup.
The institutional legal and economic environment has triggered
movement from firms in emerging or developing countries looking
to reach higher levels of legitimization in their corporate governance.
For example, many firms from middle income, developing and
emerging markets are listed in the New York or London Stock
Exchange to prove to their stakeholders that they seek to meet the
highest economic and governance standards. The movement in the
other direction also occurs, when firms from the industrialized world
operate in less developing or emerging markets. These firms make
such a move, among other things, to take advantage of institutional
arbitrage—such as weak enforcement of global environmental
regulations, cheaper labor, or favorable government incentives. Both
of these very common internationalization patterns expand beyond
the ideas in the legal origins literature in showing that it is almost
impossible to attribute economic advantages to merely one single
legal or economic system when most firms operate multiple layers of
legal systems and their value chain is affected differently. Today, the
39. GLENN MORGAN, RICHARD WHITLEY & ELI MOEN, CHANGING CAPITALISMS
(2005).
40. MARIE-LAURE DJELIC, EXPORTING THE AMERICAN MODEL (1998).
41. Trevor Buck & Azura Shahrim, The Translation of Corporate Governance Changes
Across National Cultures: The Case of Germany, 36 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 42 (2005).
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analogy is that firms are often born simultaneously in multiple
countries (e.g., KPMG) or they are born global or born-again
global, they grow in multiple countries around the world, yet they
must die in one country (e.g., Lehman Brothers, Enron, Arthur
Andersen).42
A recent trend that challenges even more directly the idea that a
certain legal system is best for economic development or that legal
systems are ultimately constraining development is the concept of
the “New Multinationals” as suggested by Guillén and GarcíaCana.43 This concept is probably the strongest robustness test to
refute the hypothesis that strong country-level institutions, and
particularly the legal environment, is a necessary condition to
economic development. The new multinational enterprises from
emerging, upper-middle income, and rich oil countries have
overcome the so-called liability of foreignness in the different
markets by entering developed and developing countries
simultaneously from the first stages of their international
expansion.44 In this context, as suggested by Cuervo-Cazurra and
Genc, new multinationals tend to possess critical political capabilities
enabling them to succeed in countries with weak institutional
environments and compensate for their lack of resource
endowment.45 In sum, this research in the internationalization field
shows that MNEs’ success, such as that of Inditex of Spain (Zara) or
Haier in China, can be achieved almost irrespective of the
institutional environment.
To conclude, we think that legal scholarship could benefit a great
deal by drawing a bit more on research on national business
systems,46 on the comparative capitalism approach,47 and more
42. See generally Jim Bell, Rod McNaughton & Stephen Young, ‘Born-Again Global’
Firms: An Extension to the ‘Born-Global’ Phenomenon, 7 J. INT’L MGMT. 173 (2001).
43. See generally Mauro Guillén & Esteban García-Canal, The American Model of the
Multinational Firm and the “New” Multinationals from Emerging Economies, 23 ACAD.
MGMT. PERSP. 23 (2009).
44. Id. at 43.
45. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra & Mehmet Genc, Transforming Disadvantages into
Advantages: Developing-Country MNEs in the Least Developed Countries, 39 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 957, 963–66 (2008).
46. RICHARD WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURING AND
CHANGE OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS (1999).
47. MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001);
RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM: JAPAN AND GERMANY
VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS (2000); BOB HANCKE, MARTIN RHODES & MARK THATCHER,
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historically oriented institutional analysis.48 We also need to think
more systematically about how employees contribute to the value
added to the firm, from a stakeholder perspective as suggested in the
UK-U.S. comparison49 and from the perspective of the knowledge
economy.50 Other authors have stressed the role of employees in the
finance-legal relationship by studying the political power of workers51
or the economics of human assets.52 This previous research shows
that bringing labor into the equation helps us examine what might
seem a remote link between employees, company resources, and
national and global financing “machines” as Davis has shown with
the securitization of mortgages into bonds and the takeoff of pension
plans with the emergence of weaker and more flexible labor contracts
in postindustrial America.53
Firms and markets coevolve, institutions change, not only at the
regulatory level, but also within technological and knowledge
spheres, and these processes are shaping economic life in a reciprocal
and evolutionary way. Economic sociology captures and illuminates
much of this coevolution; law and finance does not.

BEYOND
VARIETIES
OF
CAPITALISM:
CONFLICT,
CONTRADICTIONS,
AND
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY (2007); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001).
48. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 14; ARNDT SORGE, THE GLOBAL AND THE
LOCAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DIALECTICS OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS (2005); Kathleen Thelen,
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999).
49. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON (Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton eds., 2009); Ruth V. Aguilera et al.,
Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the U.K. and the
U.S., 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 147 (2006).
50. Peer Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organization, Finance,
Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility (Feb. 20, 2009) (Comparative Research in Law
& Political Economy (CLPE), Research Paper No. 6/2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971.
51. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2005).
52. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New
Enterprise, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 201
(Xavier Vives ed., 2000).
53. GERALD DAVIS, MANAGED BY MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA
(2009).
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III. WHY IS LLSV NONETHELESS IMPORTANT?
The above sections referred to or made the following points:
first, careful longitudinal studies and studies using more accurate
evaluations of the components of countries’ legal systems have failed
to support the central claim of LLSV—that a country’s legal origin is
an important exogenous determinant of its capacity for financial
development.54 That is to say, LLSV is based on an inaccurate view
of the law. Second, institutional analyses and comparative political
economy analyses of corporate governance arrangements with more
nuanced views than those of LLSV can contribute valuable insights
into the central question of the relationships between financial
markets and economic development, and therefore provide a more
considered view. That is to say, LLSV is based on an incomplete view
of what matters for economic outcomes. Why, then, does LLSV still
matter?
At least in part, LLSV matters because their original
contributions—their data-rich descriptions of ownership patterns
around the world—have given rise to provocative research questions
and spawned engaging academic debates and comparative analyses.55
They have established and defined the field of law and finance, and
then elaborated upon it with prodigious productivity. Few academics
can point to similar accomplishments. They are, quite simply,
academic rock stars.
Yet, as a number of contributors to this special issue discuss,56
LLSV matters for at least two additional reasons that go beyond
academics: first, because their ideas have been adopted in
international development initiatives by the World Bank as the basis
for one set of its policy prescriptions for economic development in
emerging markets; and second, because their ideas are indicative of,
and have supported, the virtually unrelenting pressure on European
countries to adopt more market-dominated systems for organizing
their economic life.
While one could think that perhaps LLSV’s ideas have simply
been misused in these regards, their own ten-year retrospective of

54. John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica & Mathias Siems, Law and Financial
Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1435.
55. See La Porta et al., supra note 2; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2.
56. See Armour et. al., supra note 54; John Ohnesorge, Legal Origins and the Tasks of
Corporate Law in Economic Development: A Preliminary Exploration, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1619.
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their work, published in 2008, ends with a clear policy preference:
“[O]ur framework suggests that the common law approach to social
control of economic life performs better than the civil law approach.
When markets do or can work well, it is better to support than to
replace them.”57 It is because LLSV’s preference for market solutions
has had such powerful reverberations in global policy developments
and European debate that it is important to examine their analysis in
more depth.
A. LLSV and the World Bank’s Doing Business Initiative
LLSV’s work is consistent with and has provided intellectual
support for a complex of policy prescriptions that are considered
important in allowing financial markets to flourish—introducing
clear property rights to facilitate exchange; protecting principles of
freedom of contract; and perhaps most central in their writing,
enhancing the legal protections for outside investors and outside
senior creditors. As described by leading law-and-development
scholar David Trubek, reform initiatives implementing these kinds of
broad policy goals have been incorporated into the World Bank’s
rule of law initiatives over the last two decades.58 These programs
derive from the Washington Consensus: the view that promoting
economic development through export-led growth, attracting
foreign investment and encouraging capital market development and
integration is the most effective way to alleviate poverty.59 Between
1990 and 2005, the World Bank has therefore supported 330 “rule
of law” initiatives at a cost of $2.9 billion.60 As Professor Trubek also
discussed, as the consensus over the Washington Consensus has
started to dissolve, the World Bank has begun to develop a broader
range of policy approaches to poverty alleviation that provides more

57. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 327. Replacing markets, in LLSV terms,
includes civil law countries’ continuing “to resort to ‘policy-implementing’ solutions to newly
arising problems,” such as “using state mandates to solve social problems, such as the thirtyfive hour work-week in France,” rather than adopting “market-supporting” solutions. Id.
58. See David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present,
and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
59. See generally John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 7 (2009).
60. Trubek, supra note 58, at 74.
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latitude to more directly address social and economic development
efforts of a ‘bottom up” nature.61
Based in significant part on LLSV’s methodology for quantifying
law, one strand of rule of law projects that is still emerging is the
World Bank’s Doing Business Initiative, begun in 2004.62 That
initiative is an ambitious attempt to collect information on the ease
of doing business in (now) 183 countries in order to quantify and
benchmark “the scope and manner of regulations that enhance
business activity and those that constrain it.”63 In 2004, five types of
business activities were evaluated in 133 countries: (1) starting a
business; (2) hiring and firing workers (the “Employing Workers’
Index,” which became particularly controversial); (3) enforcing a
contract; (4) getting credit; and (5) closing a business.64 In 2005,
two more measures were added for (6) registering property; and
(7) protecting investors.65 In 2007, additional measures evaluating
(8) business taxes; (9) trading across borders; and (10) dealing with
licenses were added.66 From these submeasures the World Bank
produces an ordinal ranking of countries on the ease of doing
business, a ranking that suggests in 2010 the rather counterintuitive
view that it is better to do business in Thailand, Georgia, Saudi
Arabia, Malaysia, or Estonia versus Germany, the Netherlands,
Austria, France, or Spain.67
Initial exposition by the World Bank of the premises of the
project show the close intellectual affinity to LLSV’s work, as the
Bank concluded in 2004 that “[h]eavier regulation of business
activities generally brings bad outcomes, while clearly defined and
well-protected property rights enhance prosperity.”68 Lest one misses
the point, the Bank also emphasized that “[c]ommon law countries
regulate the least. Countries in the French civil law tradition the
most.”69
61. Id.
62. See generally Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The
Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007).
63. Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 1097.
65. Id. at 1098.
66. Id.
67. World Bank Report, Doing Business 2010, available at http://www.doingbusiness.
org/economyrankings/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
68. Davis & Kruse, supra note 62, at 1102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In a thoughtful evaluation of the Doing Business Initiative, Davis
and Kruse praise the project for its attempt to systematically evaluate
business environments. However, they also express concerns over the
methodology, given that “law is inherently difficult to measure in
quantitative terms,”70 and given the lack of empirical evidence (other
than from LLSV and acolytes we would suggest) that the parameters
they have chosen to evaluate have a clear relationship with important
social and economic outcomes in developing economies.71
Moreover, some of the elements being evaluated are ideologically
charged, such as those giving higher scores to countries in which it is
easy to hire and fire workers and in which business taxes are low.72
Seeing how the World Bank describes changes its methodology in
2009 for “scoring” labor gives a good indication of the perspective:
The methodology for one of the Doing Business topics—
employing workers—was updated this year. . . . The scope of the
question on night and weekly holiday work has been limited to
manufacturing activities in which continuous operation is
economically necessary. Legally mandated wage premiums for night
and weekly holiday work up to a threshold are no longer
considered a restriction. In addition, the calculation of the
minimum wage ratio was modified to ensure that an economy
would not benefit in the scoring from lowering the minimum wage
to below $1.25 a day, adjusted for purchasing power parity. This
level is consistent with recent adjustments to the absolute poverty
line. Finally, the calculation of the redundancy cost was adjusted so
that having severance payments or unemployment protections
below a certain threshold does not mean a better score for an
economy.73

Clearly there are political forces at work much beyond LLSV’s
analysis to make these kinds of assumptions palatable to some people
(but by no means all people) working in an institution like the World
Bank, whose primary goal is to eradicate poverty. It is surprising that
a development agency’s metric would reward pay levels below the
absolute poverty line or would reward lowering social protections for
workers who are fired or unemployed. Prior to the changes in
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1109–12.
Id. at 1112–14.
THE WORLD BANK, IFC, & PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, DOING BUSINESS 2010:
REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT TIMES 78 (2009).
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methodology in 2009, that was precisely the direction that countries’
reform efforts could take in order to increase their score in the
Doing Business Initiative, and to increase their likelihood of
attracting funding from the World Bank or the U.S. Millenium
Challenge Accounts.74 Further research should evaluate the extent to
which other, more direct World Bank development initiatives with
proven potential to reduce poverty, such as educating girls in rural
societies, were sacrificed on behalf of the Doing Business Initiative.
To the extent that LLSV’s work informs both the methodology
and assumptions of the Doing Business project—and their own
retrospective discusses their involvement and the reforms the project
has encouraged—concerns regarding the reliability of LLSV’s
methodology and results (as discussed above and by Deakin and
other scholars)75 are heightened. Some of the legal reforms that the
Doing Business Initiative promotes presumably have positive
consequences for enhancing social welfare outcomes, such as reforms
that shrink the size of the unofficial economy or permit extremely
low-income people to advance ownership claims over property. By
failing to untangle those reforms that improve the lives of the poor
from those that simply mesh with the political commitments of
economists such as LLSV, though, the World Bank risks
undermining both its reputation and its efficacy in achieving its core
mission.
B. LLSV and the Promotion of Shareholder Corporate Governance
It is beyond the remit of this short Essay to demonstrate the
various ways in which European countries and companies have been
under constant pressure over the last three decades to adopt socalled Anglo-Saxon concepts of corporate governance and finance;
that is, until August 2007 when the global financial fabric began to
unravel. When the intellectual history of this era is written, these
authors have no doubt that it will show that a “west wind was
blowing” as cadres of professors, asset managers, shareholder
activists, and institutional investors from the United States enjoyed
European hospitality on a quite regular basis (every summer for
many professors), even as they encouraged European leaders,
countries, and companies to adopt American values, specifically
74. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 62, at 1116.
75. Armour et al., supra note 54.
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American “shareholder value,” rather than stakeholder value, as the
touchstone of proper corporate governance. At a macro level, a
deeply held belief in the superiority of market mechanisms rather
than government involvement for solving important social
coordination problems underlies much of this promotional activity,
influenced by three decades of deregulatory political and economic
theory.76
LLSV’s thesis shares this faith in markets, and their work
supports legal rules, such as those protecting minority shareholders,
to encourage financial markets to flourish. As they summarize:
In sum, there is by now a great deal of evidence that legal origins
influence legal rules and regulations, which in turn have substantial
impact on important economic outcomes—from financial
development, to unemployment, to investment and entry, to the
size of the unofficial economy, to international trade. Much of this
evidence suggests that common law is associated with better
economic outcomes than French civil law.77

Even so, they point out that “it is less clear that legal origins
predict aggregate growth.”78 The authors expound:
[The finding that it is uncertain whether legal origins predict
aggregate growth] resonates with the obvious observation made by
LLSV (1998) that countries like France and Belgium achieved high
living standards despite their legal origin. One possible explanation
of the aggregate growth evidence is that civil law countries have
found compensating mechanisms to overcome the baggage of their
legal tradition in the long run.79

Indeed, as the authors stated in a footnote, “We note, however, that
the evidence on the relationship between [legal origin] institutions
and aggregate growth more generally, which seemed substantial a
few years ago, has been crumbling.”80
This last admission is the point at which one wonders if the
asserted superiority of the common law system for “better economic
outcomes” is also crumbling. If the financial development that is

76. Frank Jan De Graaf & Cynthia A. Williams, The Intellectual Foundations of the
Global Financial Crisis, 32:2 U. NEW S. WALES L. REV. 390, 402–05 (2009).
77. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 302.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 302 n.11 (citation omitted).
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encouraged by common law legal origins is not leading to higher
aggregate economic growth, then on what basis is financial
development a useful measure of better economic outcomes? And on
what basis is a high level of financial development per se a good thing
and demonstrative of institutional superiority if it does not lead to
higher aggregate growth in the real economy? These are questions
policy makers are posing today in light of the global financial crisis.
An example is found in the Turner Review for the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in the UK, where Lord Turner observed that in the
UK and the U.S., from the 1980s on, “[t]he evolution of the
securitised credit model was accompanied by a remarkable growth in
the relative size of wholesale financial services within the overall
economy, with activities internal to the banking system growing far
more rapidly than end services to the real economy.”81
It seems likely that the measure of financial development LLSV
use as their indicator of better outcomes from common law legal
origins, stock market capitalization per GDP,82 is simply a measure of
the degree of financialization of a particular economy. This view is
consistent with the data LLSV present at Table 7 of their ten-year
retrospective reprinted in part below. This table shows that most
countries experienced an increase in stock market capitalization per
GDP between 1990 and 1999, 83 a time when the technology bubble
in stock prices was developing in many advanced economies, pushing
stock market values higher generally. Table 7 also shows that in a
number of countries, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP
grew dramatically higher from 1990 to 1999, most notably in the
United Kingdom (from 0.81 to 2.25) (English legal origin); the
United States (0.54 to 1.52) (English legal origin); the Netherlands
(0.50 to 2.03) (French legal origin); Switzerland (1.93 to 3.23)
(German legal origin); and Sweden (0.39 to 1.77) (Scandinavian
legal origin).84

81. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 16 (2009).
82. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 316–18.
83. Id. at 317.
84. Id.
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85

STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION OVER GDP
Country
Australia
Canada
India
South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Avg Common Law

Legal Origin
English
English
English
English
English
English

Argentina
Belgium
Brazil
Chile
Cuba
Egypt, Arab Rep.
France
Italy
Netherlands
Russian Federation
Spain
Avg French Law

French
French
French
French
French
French
French
French
French
French
French

Austria
German
Germany
German
Japan
German
Switzerland
German
Avg German Law
Denmark
Scandinavian
Norway
Scandinavian
Sweden
Scandinavian
Avg Scandinavian Law

1990
0.37
1.22
0.16
1.33
0.81
0.54
0.74

1999
1.13
1.22
0.46
1.20
2.25
1.52
1.30

0.31
0.08
0.50

0.15
0.82
0.45
1.05

0.06
0.24
0.13
0.50
0.41
0.28

0.29
1.17
0.68
2.03
0.11
0.69
0.74

0.17
0.20
1.64
1.93
0.99
0.67
0.23
0.39
0.43

0.17
0.67
0.95
3.23
1.26
0.67
0.70
1.77
1.05

If, as it seems, the legal origins measure of stock market
capitalization to GDP does not relate to or predict aggregate growth
but perhaps does measure financialization, then this outcome
measure may, in more market economies, be inversely related to better
economic outcomes. While this is frank speculation, it is based on
the view that the underlying strengths and stabilities of European
social democracies perhaps ameliorated the worst excesses and
instabilities of financialization even where financialization was well

85. Id. at 317 tbl.7 (data from previous years omitted).

1431

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2010 12:39 PM

2009

advanced (such as in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden,
above).
With our argument that financialization per se is not a useful
measure of “better economic outcomes,” and with debate amongst
economists concerning the value to countries’ economies of foreign
direct investment in predicting better economic outcomes for
developing economies,86 LLSV need to concentrate on higher
unemployment levels and a larger informal economy in civil law
countries to make the case that “common law is associated with
better economic outcomes.”87 Unemployment levels and the extent
of informal economies are undoubtedly important measures of real
economic benefits or detriments from systems of laws, regulations,
and norms, and so it is here that LLSV’s analysis is most persuasive.
Yet, LLSV seem to be engaging in academic cherry picking. A more
comprehensive look at other measures of the economic benefits of
the European (civil law) systems of social and economic organization
suggests as much.
In his recent book, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded
Planet, economist Jeffrey Sachs compares data on various measures
of economic health between the social-welfare states of Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden; the mixed economies of Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands (which has
aspects of both social welfare and mixed economy); and the more
free-market countries of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.88 Professor Sachs
presents data showing lower poverty rates in the social-welfare states
(5.6%) compared to the mixed economies (9%), compared to the
free-market states (12.6%), with the United States showing a poverty
rate of 17.1%.89 (The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of
people living at less than half the average national household
income).90 The Gini coefficient, which measures the equality of
86. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization, and the
IMF, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 57, 64–65 (2004). LLSV use higher levels of foreign
direct investment as a positive measure of a country’s economic health, but as the Stiglitz
article shows, this view is not universal among economists: foreign direct portfolio investment
is associated with higher levels of economic and currency volatility and political instability.
87. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 302.
88. JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET 258
(2008).
89. Id. at 261.
90. Id.
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wealth distribution within countries, where 0 is perfectly equal and
100 is perfectly unequal was 24.7 for social-welfare states; 28 for the
mixed economies; and 32 for the free-market economies, with the
United States at 35.7.91 Average per capita income is higher in the
social-welfare states as compared to the free-market economies, with
the mixed economies placing third.92 And, contrary to LLSV’s
conclusions, Professor Sachs presents data showing that “the socialwelfare states have an even higher employment rate (number of
workers as a share of the working-age population) than the freemarket countries.”93 He concludes that “the social-welfare states
have achieved high levels of incomes, low rates of poverty, and a
more equal distribution of incomes than the free-market societies.”94
These conclusions provide a sharp contrast to LLSV’s incomplete
picture of the economic outcomes asserted to flow from legal
origins, and suggest that the debates over the superiority of different
capitalist systems of economic organization should not be considered
over.
IV. CONCLUSION
LLSV’s research purporting to demonstrate the importance of
the legal origins of a country for its stock market development and
ownership dispersion, mediated through the protection of minority
shareholders as against directors, has been subjected to enough
further, careful analysis that we can see both the inaccuracies and the
importance of their research.
In this Essay, we have suggested that economic sociology has
much to add to the raw facts of ownership patterns within countries.
There are provocative hints that companies with controlling
shareholders can actually outperform companies without, contingent
on the nature of the owners (family, state, bank, parent company,
etc.), the type of industrial sector, the stage of the firm’s life cycle,
and the other institutional arrangements in the country. Putting
ownership patterns on the agenda of academic inquiry was clearly an
important contribution by LLSV. Understanding what those
patterns imply about firm performance, within different institutional

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
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arrangements and complementarities, is yet to be fully addressed,
either in their work or in comparative corporate governance
generally.
We have also suggested that it is important to understand the
contributions, if any, of legal origins to positive economic measures of
a country’s health, fully conceived. Financial measures alone do not
suffice to provide that understanding, as we have argued above. In
light of the collapse of innovative financialization over the past year,
and the resulting global recession, we should re-examine LLSV’s
fundamental conceptions—and perhaps misconceptions—of the
value of stock market capitalization per se as a measure of healthy
economics.
In short, we have not reached the “end of history” for law and
finance.
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